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- Introduced `critic`, an independent adversarial reviewer for security and correctness. - Added `fable-orchestrator` to manage task routing and verification. - Implemented `gauntlet-critic` for fresh-context evaluation of gauntlet rounds. - Created `planner` for generating executable implementation plans with dependencies. - Developed `security-auditor` for application security reviews and audits. - Established `system-steward` to improve agent prompts and skills based on verified failures. - Added `dev-loop` skill for autonomous development loops over repositories. - Implemented `gauntlet-loop` skill for iterative quality benchmarking against reference standards. - Updated project settings to utilize the new orchestrator agent. - Created documentation for `GAUNTLET.md`, `PROGRESS.md`, and `REFERENCE_BAR.md` to track project status and quality benchmarks. - Added detailed prompting style guide to enhance understanding of prompt patterns and agentic loops.
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name, description, allowed-tools
| name | description | allowed-tools |
|---|---|---|
| attack-surface | Build and maintain docs/attacksurface.md — a living inventory of everything deployed (sites, APIs, databases, vendors, hosts) with tech, auth, exposure, and known misconfigurations. Use when adding or changing infrastructure, before a security review, or on a scheduled cadence. | Read Grep Glob Bash Write Edit |
Maintain docs/attacksurface.md as the single running inventory of this project's deployed attack surface. Do not create exploit code or test against systems the user has not authorized.
- Read
docs/attacksurface.md(create it from the template below if absent),docs/ARCHITECTURE.md, and infra/config sources actually present: IaC,Dockerfile/compose, CI configs,.env.example, deploy manifests, and dependency manifests. Prefer evidence in the repo over assumption; list unknowns rather than guessing. - For each deployed asset, capture: name, type (web property / API / database / queue / job / static site), tech and version, self-hosted vs third-party, how you authenticate into it, audience/exposure (public / internal / VPN / token / OAuth), the defenses in place, and the common misconfigurations and CVE classes for that platform.
- Update the inventory in place: add new assets, revise changed ones, and mark retired ones. Keep each entry to a scannable row plus notes — this is a control plane, not a report.
- Recommend a testing/review cadence per asset based on criticality × exposure × change rate (e.g. public auth endpoint = frequent; internal cron = rare).
- Never write secrets, tokens, credentials, or live keys into the file. Reference where a secret lives, not its value.
docs/attacksurface.md template
# Attack surface
> Living inventory of everything deployed and its exposure. Updated whenever infrastructure changes and before each security review. Contains no secrets — only references to where secrets live.
## Assets
| Asset | Type | Tech / version | Hosted | Auth in | Exposure | Defenses | Review cadence |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| [name] | [web/API/db/...] | [stack] | [self/3p] | [OAuth/key/...] | [public/internal/VPN] | [WAF, ratelimit, ...] | [freq] |
## Per-asset notes
### [asset name]
- **Common misconfigs / CVE classes:** [platform-specific]
- **Known exposure:** [what an attacker reaches, from where]
- **Secrets location:** [vault/manager path — not the value]
- **Last reviewed:** [date + result]
## Gaps / unknowns
- [asset or config not yet mapped]